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This article analyses over 400 life trajectories of ordinary peasants in order
to complement top-down studies of the Rwandan political transition.
Changes and differences according to the ethnicity of the respondents
shed light on the Hutu–Tutsi bi-polarity which underlies the transition
and reveal a reversal in perceived ethnic dominance accompanying the de-
cisive moment in the political transition: the overthrow of the Hutu-
dominated regime by the Tutsi-led RPF. This suggests that the experience
of the nature of governance and the (perceived) proximity to power lies at
the heart of ethnic awareness. The nature of governance at the periphery of
society is explored, and the article demonstrates that the instrumental
stance on ethnic identity adopted by the post-genocide regime is not only
erroneous but counter-productive. Adjusting the socio-political environ-
ment in which identities thrive is more important than a direct focus
on identity constructs when developing policies to prevent ethnically
structured violence.
DESPITE MUCH WRITING ON RWANDA’S TRANSITION from a Hutu-
dominated ‘developmental dictatorship’ through civil war and genocide
to the Tutsi-dominated RPF government, the experience of transition by
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the ordinary population remains largely unexplored.1 This article offers a
bottom-up perspective that intends to ‘bring peasants back into an un-
derstanding of the political and social processes of the state’2 by focusing
on ‘the voices of people who have nuanced stories to tell: Rwandan
farmers whose lives are socially constructed’.3 A bottom-up perspective
on ‘transition’ is necessary, and this material is used to bring into focus
one of Rwanda’s taboo social constructs par excellence: ethnicity.
If, as David Newbury suggests, Rwanda’s ethnic identities are socially
produced and ‘deeply influenced by power’ such that ‘changes in these cat-
egories are related to changes in the power context’,4 this article asks what
happens to ethnicity after a political transition from a regime that rested its
power on the idea of Hutu supremacy towards a regime with power con-
solidated in the hands of a former Tutsi minority-dominated rebel group?5
A danger of reification exists when focusing on crude ethnic categories.
As Nigel Eltringham rightly remarks, one has to avoid ‘absolutist schema of
social distinction that they [genocide perpetrators] project on to society and
the absolutist version of history to which they appeal’.6 But the focus in
this article on ethnicity does not imply that other dimensions of Rwandan
identities – such as socio-economic class, professional status, regional af-
filiation, gender, or age – are ignored or considered to be irrelevant. On
the contrary, a comparative micro-analysis of the genocide demonstrates,
1. On the Rwandan transition between 1990 and 1994, see Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des
Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988–1994 (Editions Karthala, Paris, 1994); Gerard
Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a genocide (Columbia University Press, New York,
NY, 1995); André Guichaoua (ed.), Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993–
1994) (Editions Karthala, Paris, 1995); René Lemarchand, ‘Managing transition anarchies:
Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa in comparative perspective’, Journal of Modern African
Studies 32, 4 (1994), pp. 581–604. On (mainly) the second phase of the transtion see Filip
Reyntjens, ‘La transition politique au Rwanda’ in Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse
(eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2003–2004 (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004), pp. 1–22;
Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411
(2004), pp. 177–210; Filip Reyntjens, ‘Les transitions politiques au Rwanda et au Burundi’ in
Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse (eds) L’Afrique des Grands Lacs – dix ans de transitions
conflictuelles: Annuaire 2005–2006 (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006), pp. 3–23; Marina Rafti, ‘A per-
ilous path to democracy: political transition and authoritarian consolidation in Rwanda’
(Discussion Paper 2008.03, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Antwerp,
2007).
2. David Newbury and Catharine Newbury, ‘Bringing peasants back in: agrarian themes in
the construction and corrosion of statist historiography in Rwanda’, American Historical Review
105, 3 (2000), p. 874.
3. Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twen-
tieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), p. 202.
4. David Newbury, ‘Understanding genocide’, African Studies Review 41, 1 (1998), p. 85.
5. To understand the nature of the ideological underpinnings of the previous regime see
Philip Verwimp, ‘Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide’, Journal of Genocide
Research 2, 3 (2000), pp. 325–61.
6. Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-genocide debates in Rwanda (Pluto Press,
London, 2004), p. xiv.
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for example, that the violence unleashed at the macro level was appropri-
ated and fundamentally shaped by the micro-political matrices and social
formations in which it took hold.7 Genocide, although shaped from above,
was significantly reshaped in a highly differentiated terrain of local social
tensions and cleavages, regional differences, and communal or individual
particularities. The genocidal violence reflected both the goals of the su-
pra-local forces and factors – mainly the Hutu–Tutsi cleavage mobilized
by political actors for political purposes – and their local shadows – strug-
gles for power, fear, (intra-group) coercion, the quest for economic
resources and personal gain, vendettas and the settling of old scores.8
This article nevertheless focuses on ethnicity because Rwanda is a
bi-polar society with Hutu (approximately 84 percent) and Tutsi (approx-
imately 14 percent) as the main identity groups marking the social and
political landscape; but also because of the fact that the master narratives
of the 1994 genocide and other periods of violence and war in Rwandan
history were always structured along ethnic lines, even if the mobilizing
momentum was (partly) derived from other motivating forces. And – most
importantly – because ethnicity has officially been banned from public life
it has become an unobservable variable in most (empirical) studies of post-
genocide Rwanda. The few studies that have focused on identity suggest
that ‘ethnicity remains a central factor for Rwandan social identity’9 and
that ‘today (ethnic) group identity is meaningful (arguably even more than
before the genocide)’10 or that ‘the Hutu/Tutsi distinctions are more rigid
than ever’.11 Penal Reform International, an NGO undertaking research
7. Bert Ingelaere, ‘Changing lenses and contextualizing the Rwandan (post-)genocide’ in
Reyntjens and Marysse (eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs – dix ans, pp. 389–414.
8. For studies based on micro-level research highlighting the importance of either political or
economic motives in the genocide, see Timothy Longman, ‘Genocide and socio-political
change: massacres in two Rwandan villages’, Issue: A Journal of Public Opinion 13, 2 (1995),
pp. 18–21; Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land relations under unbearable
stress: Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation
34 (1998), pp. 1–47; Michelle D. Wagner, ‘All the bourgemestre’s men: making sense of geno-
cide in Rwanda’, Africa Today 45, 1 (1998), pp. 25–36; Villia Jefremovas, Brickyards to
Graveyards: From production to genocide in Rwanda (State University of New York Press, Al-
bany, NY, 2002); Danielle de Lame, A Hill among a Thousand: Transformations and ruptures
in rural Rwanda (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2005); André Guichaoua,
Rwanda 1994: les politiques du génocide à Butare (Editions Karthala, Paris, 2005); Philip Ver-
wimp, ‘An economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide: micro-level evidence from
Rwanda’, Journal of Development Economics 77, 2 (2005), pp. 297–323; S. Straus, The Order
of Genocide: Race, power and war in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London,
2006); Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda: un genocide populaire (Editions Karthala, Paris, 2008).
9. Timothy Longman, ‘Memory, identity and community in Rwanda’ in Eric Stover and
Harvey M. Weinstein (eds), My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath
of mass atrocity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), p. 176.
10. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, ‘Dividing and uniting: the use of citizenship discourses in con-
flict and reconciliation in Rwanda’, Global Society 20, 1 (2006), p. 112.
11. Eugenia Zorbas, ‘Reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda’, African Journal of Legal Stud-
ies 1, 1 (2004), p. 42.
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on the gacaca process and reconciliation, observes that Rwandans do not
contest that they are all Rwandans, but that this does not necessarily mean
that the feeling of ethnic belonging persists as well: ‘the racist and discrim-
inatory dimension of ethnic belonging does not appear diminished’.12
Although these studies are very well researched and argued, an under-
standing of the breadth of such arguments remains absent.
This article therefore has two interrelated objectives: exploring in a
systematic way the enduring and changing aspects of ethnicity in the
context of Rwanda’s political transition, and offering a methodological
example of research on a difficult topic in a closed and controlled research
environment.
Fieldwork and methodology
Rwanda’s political transition started in 1990, but entered a new phase in
1994 with the genocide and then the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF). In order to capture the dynamics of change over this long period, an
appropriate methodology is needed. Crucially, this methodological ap-
proach needs to facilitate the understanding of perceived comparisons
without asking respondents explicit questions about the differences between
the two regimes, let alone asking directly about perceived changes with re-
spect to ethnicity. Direct questions of this kind by foreign researchers are
not only unwelcome to the Rwandan political establishment and adminis-
trative authorities, but also tend to trigger politically correct answers from
respondents.13 Fieldwork on ethnic identities requires an innovative
approach if it is to produce useful results. A thorough understanding of
the socio-political and cultural context is required to capture not only trust-
worthy statements but, especially, undercurrents of social processes at
work. Related to the identity question, Jennie Burnet concludes after
months of ethnographic research in Rwanda that ‘the RPF-regime has dis-
guised the “ethnism” embedded in institutional and structural violence’.14
These undercurrents, if they exist, will only come to the surface during
‘rare moments of political electricity when . . . the hidden transcript is
spoken directly and publicly in the teeth of power’.15 In the absence of
12. Penal Reform International, ‘From camp to hill: the reintegration of released prisoners’
(research report on the Gacaca, Report VI, Paris and Kigali, 2004), p. 38.
13. On the particular nature of communication in Rwanda see Bert Ingelaere, ‘“Does the
truth pass across the fire without burning?” Locating the short circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca
courts’, Journal of Modern African Studies 47, 4 (2009), pp. 507–28.
14. Jennie E. Burnet, ‘Whose genocide? Whose truth? Representations of victim and perpe-
trator in Rwanda’ in Alex Laban Hinton and Kevin O’Neill (eds), Genocide: Truth, memory and
representation (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2009).
15. James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden transcripts (Yale University
Press, New Haven, CT and London, 1990), p. 14.
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such events, one has to find an interpretation of the ‘cryptic and opaque’.16
In Rwanda – as elsewhere – there is a second world lying beyond political
correctness and rehearsed consensus.
Therefore, the topic was approached sideways by collecting life histories
and subjective rankings from significant numbers of respondents.17 The re-
spondents not only told their own stories, but also – indirectly – the story of
regime change and the story of changes in ethnic perceptions over time. An
analysis of these numerous life story elements in the narratives enabled us
to understand what it means to live through a transition, a period of vio-
lence, and to move from one regime into another. Apart from this
qualitative or ethnographic research strategy, there was an added quantita-
tive element to the exercise.18 During each life story interview an image was
used to help the respondents in assessing the key theme of the feeling of
political representation in the different periods in their lifespan (Figure 1).19
In the life story interviews a value between –5 and +5 was given (by the
respondent) through pointing to the appropriate step on the ladder for each
year during the adult life cycle.
First, the nature of the image was explained: on top of the ladder are
those people who feel the most politically represented in ‘the community
of the respondent’, so as to avoid comparison with residents of Kigali,
which would oblige them (in their perception) always to choose the bottom
steps. The spatial reference is their own community, and the field sites in
16. Ibid., p. 137.
17. A life story approach in Rwanda has previously been adopted by Helen Codere, The Bi-
ography of an African Society: Rwanda 1900–1960. Based on forty-eight Rwandan autobiographies
(Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika, Tervuren, Series In-8°, No. 79, 1973); Catharine
Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960 (Columbia
University Press, New York, NY, 1988); de Lame, A Hill among a Thousand. For the post-
genocide period, see Susan M. Thomson, Resisting Reconciliation: Everyday life and state power
in post-genocide Rwanda(Dalhousie University, unpublished PhD thesis, 2009).
18. The aim of the research activities was to strike a balance between collecting quantitative
rankings and qualitative narratives. In order to increase the sample more emphasis was put on
gathering rankings from all respondents and reducing narratives. This article is informed by an
in-depth analysis of the life story narratives collected, but only presents the quantitative rank-
ings. A more extensive reference to the methodology and narratives can be found in Bert
Ingelaere, ‘Living the transition: a bottom-up perspective on Rwanda’s political transition’
(Discussion Paper 2007.06, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Antwerp,
2007).
19. Inspired by Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (Rutgers University Press,
New Brunswick, NJ, 1965). The World Bank research on movement out of poverty makes
use of a similar ‘ladder of life’ tool in order to understand perceived changes over time. This
approach was an inspiration in the development of design and methodology of this study. See
Deepa Narayan (ed.),Measuring Empowerment: Cross-disciplinary perspectives (World Bank, Wa-
shington, DC, 2005) and Deepa Narayan and Patti Petesh (eds), Moving out of Poverty: Cross-
disciplinary perspectives on mobility (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007).
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this study were always rural with predominantly peasant inhabitants.20
When the geographical area for comparison was defined and the people
on the top step characterized (step +5), the nature of the bottom step
was further explained as people who are ‘the worst off in political represen-
tation in the community’ (step –5). The enumerators and my translator
were trained (and supervised) always to use exactly the same phrasings to
explain the nature of the ladder and its steps in order to avoid a heteroge-
neous interpretation by the respondents.21 Equally important is the fact
that all respondents have a similar understanding of the concept of ‘political
representation’. The respondent was always first asked to describe in his/
her own words how he/she interpreted this notion, and the analysis of these
Figure 1. ‘Ladder of life’.
20. We refer to sectors rather than ‘villages’, as in Rwanda people live dispersed on the hills
in the countryside and are grouped in administrative units. We define the local level, a local
community, as equivalent to the cell and sector level which existed before the administrative
restructuring of January 2006.
21. All of the life story interviews and rankings were conducted by the author, together with
five Rwandan field assistants. The interviewers were selected based on their previous experi-
ence with participation in survey and qualitative research, their capacity to reside in rural
communities, and their skill in interaction with the peasant population. The enumerators were
not inhabitants of the communities. They received several days’ training on the principles and
methods of life story interviews and general fieldwork. The life stories were collected in each
community with all enumerators present and the author as supervisor. It was highlighted that
we had the permission from both national and local authorities to conduct the research. We
always stressed the fact that we were not connected or working for the government. All inter-
views were administered in the house of the respondent. The interviews were translated from
Kinyarwanda to French by a field-assistant/translator. The interviewers wrote down expres-
sions in Kinyarwanda with a specific meaning surpassing immediate possibility of
translation. These were discussed afterwards and compared with the translated statements.
All interviews were later typed out by another assistant, who would also annotate the interviews
when faced with particularities related to translation of statements from Kinyarwanda. We did
not use recording devices since respondents may not be familiar with them and they may
arouse suspicion, affecting responses.
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responses indicated a shared understanding.22 Subsequently, the respon-
dents were asked to place themselves on the ladder. The question asked
for every period or year was: ‘At this point in your life, where do you situate
the experience of political representation compared to the other inhabitants
of your community (sector)?’ Subsequently, a move back in time was made
to the year of marriage or the first year of adult life (if single), repeating the
question for that point. The same questions were then asked with reference
to the past, asking a rating for every year. The findings from the life story
narrative were used to help people recall their situation at a certain moment
in time. For example, when someone had told us he or she had a firstborn
child in 1986, reference would be made to 1986 as ‘the year when your first
child was born’. It needs to be noted that the scale (ladder) itself remains
fixed throughout the different periods in time. The scale functions as a
mental map and background against which the personal movement up
and down the ladder of life – the imaginary but stable situations/levels of
political representation – is assessed ‘in time’ and ‘in comparison’ with
the surrounding environment: the fellow community members, also mov-
ing on the ladder of life.
These rankings are indicators of perceptions, and portray changes in
rankings over time: events and periods in the past are reinterpreted through
the lens of events happening during subsequent life periods. Since no base-
line data are available, recall is the best means to get at these issues.
Moreover, since the objective is to understand the experience and percep-
tions of transition, recollection reflects how perceptions work: they are
influenced by individual experiences in the past and mediated by dis-
courses produced by the government, media, and other institutions, past
and present.
The selection of communities (sectors) was guided by the principle of
‘attaining maximum variance’.23 The variance in field sites allowed for
an indicative apprehension of life experiences incorporating various dy-
namics of historical events and state or societal practices. Field sites are
22. Rankings for the economic situation, the feeling of security and confidence, and the dis-
cussion of the narratives accompanying these rankings are discussed in Ingelaere, ‘Living the
transition: a bottom-up perspective’, pp. 24–47 and Bert Ingelaere, ‘Living the transition: in-
side Rwanda’s conflict cycle at the grassroots’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, 3 (2009),
pp. 438–63.
23. Ingelaere, ‘Living the transition: a bottom-up perspective’, pp. 19–21; this procedure
was modelled on the work of, for example, Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life:
Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 2002), and
Chris Gibson and Michael Woolcock, ‘Empowerment and local level conflict mediation in
Indonesia: a comparative analysis of concepts, measures, and project efficacy’ (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3713, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005). The communities
are situated in the different regions of Rwanda – North, Central and South-Central, East and
South-East.
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highlighted in the map (Figure 2). Large dots are sites where life stories
were collected.
Although Rwanda continues to be ethnically bi-polar, with Hutu and
Tutsi as the main ethnic groups, it is no longer permitted to identify people
through these ethnic markers; instead, ‘new’ social groups with new forms
of markers have emerged.24 Local inhabitants distinguish five social labels
to identify themselves and others. Tutsi inhabitants are divided into ‘geno-
cide survivors’ and ‘old caseload returnees’. In the latter case, they, their
parents or even their grandparents fled Rwanda after the so-called Hutu
Revolution of 1959 and returned to Rwanda after the end of the genocide
and the RPF take-over in 1994.25 Hutu inhabitants are described as ‘re-
leased prisoners’, those ‘accused in Gacaca’ and those who are ‘not
accused and have never been imprisoned’.26 Lists were compiled with
the names of all the household heads on the selected hills and several
groups of key informants were asked to identify every household according
to one of these five groups. Subsequently, through a stratified random
24. See Eltringham, Accounting for Horror for a discussion of these new identities.
25. During the life story interviews with ‘old caseload returnees’ the questions about political
representation in the 1980s (when they did not live in Rwanda) was not further qualified but
asked as prescribed in the standard procedure. It implies that respondents in their narratives
and rankings predominantly took into account both the feeling of representation in the
countries where they resided at the time and in relation to their home country, Rwanda.
26. We did not use the category of so-called ‘new caseload returnees’ since this category is
no longer salient in social life in the Rwandan hills.
Figure 2. Field sites.
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sampling scheme, households within each group were selected and the
heads of the household were interviewed with around 70 respondents in
each locality (Table 1).27 Selected persons were all over 30, since respon-
dents needed to have lived through the transition and regime changes and
be aware of the period since 1990 and 1994.28 The research is based on
several periods of research from July 2004 to April 2007, and all life story
interviews were conducted between January and April 2007.
Ethnicity in Rwanda: a constructivist reading
An analysis of peasant narratives indicates that there are at least two under-
standings of the notion ‘political representation’. Political representation
(guhagarirwa) is understood as the idea of being able to send someone to
a meeting or a decision-making body so that this person will defend your
interests. It entails the idea that the authorities become aware of your living
conditions, the problems you face and the well-being – or problems – of
those who are represented. Through almost personal contact, the represen-
tative should know ‘how you are doing’ and therefore be able to transfer a
message to the authorities higher up. This kind of representation is about
being aware of the needs of the population and responding to those needs.
Representation also involves (territorial) security and the resolution of
small-scale conflicts. An additional dimension of political representation
27. Some communities did not have old caseload returnees; others didn’t have released
prisoners.
28. Interviewers were instructed to start the ranking exercise from the first year of adult life
or marriage – or, if necessary, always in the year 1990, even if the respondent was not yet adult
or not yet married then. This implies that very few respondents were below adult age in 1990.
It also implies that for the 1980s there are less observations (rankings). Weighting was applied
in order to account for research design and sampling procedure. The figures picture the
weighted ‘average’ ranking of all respondents. For the years 1980–9, these weighted averages
are based on the rankings of less than all respondents, since some respondents were not of
adult age or were not yet married.
Table 1. Overview of respondents
Male Female Total
Hutu not accused in Gacaca/Never incarcerated 74 62 136
Hutu accused in Gacaca 68 9 77
Hutu released prisoners 58 0 58
Tutsi survivors 36 49 85
Tutsi old caseload returnees 28 25 53
Total Hutu 200 71 271
Total Tutsi 64 74 138
All respondents 264 145 409
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frequently mentioned by respondents concerns ‘how one represents’ and
how one governs. This concerns how power is exercised. Governing in
an impartial way means preventing suffering from injustices that remain un-
punished (kugukosereza); it also means that one should not be subject to
violent behaviour (guhohoterwa). Even more important is the principle that
the governed should not suffer from prejudice and injustice emanating
from the administration itself, from those who govern or misgovern. Others
should not be allowed to impede you from reaching your goal (ukubanga-
mira). A preliminary condition of feeling represented is that one does not
feel targeted by those exercising power, that one does not have the impres-
sion that ‘all means are employed to do you bad’ (kukwirunkankiraho).
Respondents were not explicitly asked to compare pre- and post-
genocide Rwanda. Instead, the findings from the subjective ranking exercise
reveal what it means to live through a political transition, from one regime
into another, from peace through violence and back into some kind of
peace. When considering the ethnic identity of the respondents, the differ-
ences in the rankings further establish an insight into a ‘hidden transcript’,
something that ‘lives’ in the population but remains invisible because
banned from public life and, therefore, difficult to capture. Figure 3 depicts
the overall evolution of perceptions of political representation between
1980 and 2006, and confirms some of the ‘understandings’ of pre- and
post-genocide Rwanda and the transition in general, while refuting others.
Strikingly, Hutu and Tutsi trajectories have evolved in remarkably similar
ways – there is never much discrepancy between Hutu and Tutsi percep-
tions. However, there is an ethnic reversal in the experience of political
representation. Hutu appreciate the nature of political representation after
the 1994 regime change in a similar way as Tutsi did during the Habyari-
Figure 3. Subjective rankings political representation (weighted results).
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mana regime. Tutsi respondents, on the other hand, situate themselves at
the level where Hutu claim their representation had been during the previ-
ous regime.
What remains to be explored and explained is, first, the fact that in pop-
ular perceptions ethnicity remains durable in post-genocide Rwanda
despite a ‘new Rwanda’ where ethnicity has been officially abolished and
where a discourse of Rwandan citizenship prevails over the use of ethnic
identity markers. The graph reveals a marked reversal of ethnic dominance
in rankings depicting the feeling of political representation, in which the
difference between the Hutu and Tutsi rankings on political representation
changes over time: diverging in the 1990s; converging since 2000; and sta-
ble in the 1980s.
These data can only be explained by invoking the nature of ethnic iden-
tities. A constructivist understanding of ethnicity suggests that, on the one
hand, ethnic identities are shaped by the socio-political context and, on the
other hand, that they have a ‘depth’ beyond utility.29 A constructivist un-
derstanding of ethnicity in Rwanda argues that the crystallization of ethnic
identities was the result of socio-political transformations starting before
the advent of colonialism, under the reign of King Rwabugiri (1865–95),
and further rigidified under colonial rule. A Tutsi identity was shaped in
relation to the wealth and power associated with royal and later government
status and institutions, while a Hutu awareness developed in relation to this
other identity group and as a result of a situation of subordination. This
insight implies that ‘internal components and the interrelations among eth-
nic categories vary over time’,30 and that power and the perceived nature of
(the proximity to) power constitute an important factor in understanding
these changes.31
Therefore, to advance the interpretation of the findings attention needs
to be paid to power in its more overt manifestation and in its various dis-
guises.32 Not only are the various (interpretations of) changes of power in
29. The crystallization and the (changing) nature of ethnic identities in Rwanda is of central
importance in the work of Catharine Newbury and David Newbury. See Catharine Newbury,
The Cohesion of Oppression; Catharine Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda: the case of Kinyaga’,
Africa 48, 1 (1978), pp. 17–29; Catharine Newbury and David Newbury, ‘A Catholic mass in
Kigali: contested views of genocide and ethnicity in Rwanda’, Canadian Journal of African
Studies 33, 2/3 (1999), pp. 312–16; David Newbury, Understanding Genocide, pp. 83–8. Both
Catharine and David Newbury’s writings on ethnicity and the importance of the factor of pow-
er were instructive in the understanding of the rankings presented in this paper. An insightful
discussion of the different paradigms to understand ethnicity is available in Varshney, Ethnic
Conflict, pp. 24–39. A social constructivist position in the understanding of violent ethnic con-
flict is examined in James. D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Violence and the social
construction of ethnic identity’, International Organization 54, 4 (2000), pp. 845–77.
30. Newbury and Newbury, ‘A Catholic mass’, p. 313.
31. Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, p. 51.
32. John Gledhill, Power and Its Disguises: Anthropological perspectives on politics (Pluto Press,
London, 1994).
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history important, but so are the socio-political changes brought about by
state-sanctioned practices at the periphery of society. Examples are given of
how state-sanctioned practices influence the interrelation of ethnic catego-
ries in the current under-observed period and further identify some clues
by breaking up the crude ethnic categories used in the graphs into ethnic
sub-categories. First, the influence of historical mentalities is addressed.
Historical legacies and mentalities
Figure 3 portrays the cartography of the perceived interrelation of power
and identity that structured and continues to structure the Rwandan so-
cio-political landscape and everyday life, at least in the consciousness of
its inhabitants. The ideological underpinnings of the Rwandan Republics
(1963–73 and 1973–94) ‘constituted both a reversal and a continuation
of [these] long-standing psycho-cultural images’ of the foreign, racially su-
perior Tutsi pastoralist and native, subaltern Hutu cultivator.33 These had
been reinforced under colonial rule, so that Hutu and Tutsi remained dis-
tinct categories even after independence and the so-called revolution. In a
historical reversal, Tutsi now became those considered ‘out of place’, infe-
rior creatures in a newly regained natural order of Hutu homogeneity and
majority control over the state:
In the neo-traditionalist 1931–59 version, the petits Tutsis felt proud of belonging to the
‘ethnic aristocracy’, although it brought them very little beyond the sense of superiority.
Now [after the Hutu revolution] it was the Hutu who fell prey to the same error and mostly
persuaded themselves that because the government was Hutu, they, the humble peasants
from the hills, somehow shared in that power.34
The current rankings reveal a similar process at work, also identifiable in
some key narratives collected during the fieldwork. The first account is
from a Tutsi genocide survivor, Albert, who lives in central Rwanda and
whose children were killed during the genocide.35
On the state, I have nothing to say. It is the state that organizes reconciliation without con-
sulting us, without consulting the wise men. It is the state that does what it wants. The state
decides what needs to be done. . . . The state says ‘you do this’ and you clap your hands. . . .
[Referring to the genocide] People put into practice whatever you ask them to do (Abantu ni
ba nyamujya iyo bigiye – Men follow the current of things). . . . We have a small pause of
calm. There is peace but without guarantee. Habyarimana also said to bring us peace, but
afterwards they killed our children. If you sleep at night and wake up in the morning, it’s
good (Ni ukubara ubukey). All changes always. Everything changes here on earth. The priest
says things happen in eternal succession, so . . . . It [massacres] are things that often happen
33. Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The development enterprise in Rwanda (Kumarian Press,
Bloomfield, CT, 1998), p. 33.
34. Gerard Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, p. 80.
35. Names of individuals and places have been changed to ensure confidentiality.
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since 1959. The authorities tell us that there is peace. For example in 1973. But see what
happened in 1994. How much time has passed since 1994 to confirm that it will never hap-
pen again?36
This statement reflects an interpretation of the alternation of power in
the course of Rwandan history and its repercussions for ordinary people
during the event itself and in the aftermath. The second quote is from a
Hutu, André, who also lives in the countryside in Central Rwanda. André
is what is called an évolué in the peasantry class. He enjoyed higher educa-
tion and is therefore considered an ‘intellectual’. His family played an
important role in the state administration during the First Republic under
President Kayibanda, but lost all their privileges when Habyarimana came
to power. André is not accused in Gacaca and was never imprisoned. His
interpretation of the nature of power changes in Rwanda is nevertheless
similar to that of Albert:
Why are you asking questions about power- sharing and democracy? In Rwandan tradition
and custom, power is symbolized by the drum [Ngoma]. If you put your hands on the drum,
it means you have power. What happens is that people are coming to put their hands on
your arms holding the drum. Those people are your family and friends, the people of your
group [ethnicity]. In that way they reap the benefits of power. But they also keep your hands
pressed against the drum so they can continue to benefit. You don’t have a lot of freedom of
manoeuvre and there is not much room for others to profit. The only means for them to
access the drum and thus power is to violently chop off the arm reaching for the drum and
supporting those other arms. The drum moves to the hands of another and other arms are
mustered to support and to be supported by the drum.37
Both accounts shed light on the ‘underneath of things’,38 on the hidden
undercurrent of ethnic politics, at least in the perception of the ordinary
peasant. Alison Des Forges similarly draws attention to the recurring re-
course to distant histories to justify present actions in her attempt to
understand the dynamics of history and genocide in Rwanda.39 These
mythico-histories are not necessarily false or true but are ways in which peo-
ple make sense of the past and the pragmatics of everyday life,40 rendering
actions and events meaningful for those involved41 and giving content to
ethnic identities and the perceived nature of their interrelation. This is un-
36. Interview, Central Rwanda, March 2006, Tutsi, genocide survivor, male, peasant, 56
years old.
37. Interview, Central Rwanda, February 2007, Hutu, male, teacher, 45 years old.
38. Marianne Ferme, The Underneath of Things: Violence, history and the everyday in Sierra
Leone, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2001).
39. Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights
Watch, New York, NY, 1999).
40. Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, memory, and national cosmology among Hutu
refugees in Tanzania (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1995), p. 55.
41. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Culture Troubles: Politics and the interpretation of
meaning (Hurst and Co., London, 2006); Gledhill, Power and Its Disguises.
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derscored when breaking down the crude ethnic categories into sub-ethnic
groups, as in Figure 4.
Mythico-histories: former refugees and released prisoners
The findings presented in Figure 4 correspond with the ‘new’ structures of
hierarchy tacitly stratifying post-genocide Rwanda: the RPF and the cur-
rent Rwandan regime are dominated by former refugees, especially those
coming from Uganda.42 Although our sample only contains ‘old caseload
returnee’ members of the peasant class and inhabitants of rural Rwanda,
the fact that they situate their own feeling of political representation very
high in contemporary Rwanda reveals that they ‘feel’ themselves to belong
to the inner circles of power. Connection with family members in Kigali
who are actually part of this power structure will contribute to this feeling
in a similar way as dignitaries in the former Hutu regime were linked with a
base of support in their regions of origin, but much more extensively and
intensely. Based on her research with Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanza-
nia, Liisa Malkii has shown that nothing enhances ethnic awareness more
than refugee status.43 Forced into ‘exile’ for years, old caseload returnees
constitute the social group that fully embraces the claim of liberation from
the former Rwandan regime that had prevented them from returning home.
On the other side of the scale are liberated Hutu prisoners. The shared fact
42. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on’.
43. Malkki, Purity and Exile.
Figure 4. Subjective ranking of ‘political representation’ – ethnic (sub-)
groups (weighted results).
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of being a prisoner and being labelled génocidaire made (former) prisoners
develop or preserve an ethnic awareness similar to that of former exiles.44
The interpretation of these findings started with the suggestion that pow-
er and ethnicity are interconnected. A constructivist reading of ethnicity
was adopted. This reading of ethnic identities was then further explored
and supporting evidence in the ‘ordinary’ or ‘perceived’ interpretation of
power changes in the past was found. Constructivism suggests that power
and the exercise of power – the socio-political environment in general – in-
fluences the (perceived) interrelation of and changes in ethnic categories.
So it needs to be verified whether and how the socio-political environment
changed. Local governance is the embodiment of the socio-political envi-
ronment and thus an additional element to be explored.
Governance in the periphery
The nature of governance, the identity of local authorities, the particularity
of their practices, and their connection with state power under the Habyar-
imana regime have been well documented.45 Less is known about the
experience of the nature of governance since the start of the transition in
1990. Insecurity, suspicion, and atrocity characterized these years. The fig-
ures visually paint the trajectory that the Rwandan transition took in the
popular perception after 1990. For many people, clearly defined rules of
conduct and social norms evaporated, creating the experience of a multi-
polar landscape with threats to the socio-political order coming from differ-
ent sides.
Fanned by the well-documented appeal to ethnic sentiments, the vio-
lence became ethnic in nature. Although the motivating forces often had
socio-economic overtones, nothing more clearly accentuates the categorical
clarity and purity of ethnic difference than violence: ‘ethnic violence pro-
duces abstract tokens of ethnicity out of bodies of real persons’.46 Or, as
Lemarchand puts it in his study on Burundi, ‘In a time of crisis, Hutu
and Tutsi emerge as the only relevant defining characteristics of group
identities, reducing all other social roles to phenomena of marginal social
significance.’47 Overt hostilities continued on Rwandan soil until 2000,
44. For an insightful and powerful description of life in the Rwandan prisons see: Carina
Tertsakina, Le Château: The lives of prisoners in Rwanda (Arves Books, London, 2008).
45. See for example, Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 42–3; James K. Gasana,
‘La guerre, la paix et la démocratie au Rwanda’ in Guichaoua (ed.), Les crises politiques,
pp. 215–16.
46. Arjun Appadurai, ‘Dead certainty: ethnic violence in the era of globalization’ in Alexan-
der L. Hinton (ed.), Genocide: An anthropological reader (Blackwell, Oxford, 2002), p. 297.
47. René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1994), p. 14.
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with RPF forces battling with Hutu insurgents invading from their bases in
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tutsi were targeted by these assailants,
but this time they were not attacked by their own government, which, after
the military victory of the RPF, was considered to be ‘on their side’. Count-
er-insurgency campaigns in the north of the country often resorted to brutal
tactics: erasing all Hutu inhabitants in the hills, given that they were indis-
tinguishable from the infiltrators and often supported them. It is thus no
surprise that the nature of political representation remained low for ordi-
nary Hutu in that period. Violence was the mode of governance chosen
in these years. As a consequence, as can be seen in the graphs, levels of
political representation were low for both for Hutu and Tutsi.
Life only approached normality again after the year 2000. But the iden-
tity of power holders in key positions at the local level and the (perceived)
nature of the exercise of power continue to give an ethnic dimension to the
experience of political representation in post-genocide rural Rwanda. Often
local administrative personnel in key positions have a particular profile. Of-
ten, but not always, they are of Tutsi identity as can be seen from Table 2,
which compares these profiles over time in the field sites where life stories
were collected. These positions were previously almost exclusively occu-
pied by Hutu.
Although state institutions and state policies are intended to overcome
ethnic divisions, they also perpetuate – at least in many ordinary people’s
perceptions – the very cleavages they are supposed to eradicate. The im-
portance accorded by the central administration, and the power attached
to these different posts in the local governance structure, are in the first
place reflected in the balance between elected and appointed positions
(Figure 5). Only persons occupying appointed positions receive a regular
salary from the central/district administration, a privilege reflecting the im-
portance attached to the post. The executive secretary is the most powerful
person in the sector. As explained above, s/he is currently often Tutsi, and
unknown to the area, having been appointed by central authorities. Elected
positions are occupied by Hutu originating from the area, but they are not
paid and do not have real power. The executive secretary needs to stick to
so-called performance contracts signed with authorities higher up. These
contracts are referred to as imihigo, and refer to the capability to show
others and observers that one is capable and competent in the execution
of a given set of tasks.48 This implies that the chain of accountability goes
upwards towards higher authorities and not downwards towards the pop-
48. The concept of imihigo refers to the ‘heroism’ of the soldier in Rwandan culture and
history. The soldier attempts through his actions in combat to show his competence and ca-
pability as a ‘hero’. Recently performance contracts are also being signed with individual
peasants. See: ‘Performance contracts to be signed at household level’, The New Times, Kigali,
19 November 2007.
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Table 2. Profile of local governance personnel in six field sites (1980–2007)
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6
1980s
Bourgmestre Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu
Conseiller Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Hutu Mixed Hutu Hutu
Dominant Party MRND MRND MRND MRND MRND MRND
1990–4
Bourgmestre Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu
Conseiller Hutu Hutu Hutu Tutsi Hutu Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Hutu Mixed Hutu Hutu
Dominant Party MDR MDR MRND/CDR PL MRND/CDR MRND
2006–7
Exec. Secretary (Bourgmestre) Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi N/A
Coordinator (Conseiller) Hutu Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Tutsi Hutu
Responsables Hutu Mixed Mixed Tutsi Hutu Hutu
Dominant Party RPF RPF RPF RPF RPF RPF
MRND = Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement; MDR = Mouvement Démocratique Républicain; CDR = Coalition pour la
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ulation; the most powerful person is appointed, not elected. The function-
ing of this structure and its impact is again remarkably similar to what
Catharine Newbury found in her study of the social preconditions of the
1959 revolution.49 Similarly, Reyntjens notes that with the outcome of the
1959 Hutu revolution, in terms of the socio-political organization of
Rwandan society, ‘there had been a change in the occupants of the roles
but no major change in the structuring of the roles’.50 The structures of
governance observed in pre-colonial Rwanda thus altered over time, but
did not change fundamentally. Also, in post-genocide Rwanda, there is
no fundamental difference observable in the functioning of the local gov-
ernance structure when compared with previous eras, except for the fact
that the ethnic identity of the occupants changed in the bulk of the cases.
Both Hutu and Tutsi can contact local authorities if necessary and both
are subject to harsh state exigencies. The difference, however, is that the
dominant political order serves to guarantee physical safety for Tutsi geno-
cide survivors or Tutsi returnees. As explained, the understanding of the
notion of political representation entails the idea that no injustice or prej-
udice emanates from the structures of power. This understanding, coupled
with the (changing) nature of the rankings, signals that Tutsi respondents
perceive fewer prejudices in the operating of the structures of government
as under the previous regime. But it implies more prejudice in the experi-
ence of Hutu respondents.
49. Catharine Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’, p. 20.
50. Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda: droit public et evolution politique, 1916–1973
(Musée Royal de L’Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, 1985), p. 515 (translated by the author).
Figure 5. Local governance structure from 2006 onwards.
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As much as the former regime was overtly vested in the idea of Hutu su-
premacy, these state contemporary practices perpetuate in a much more
tacit fashion what they are supposedly eradicating – Hutu and Tutsi sub-
cultures or awareness.51 It signals an increasing ethnicization. It is the
continuation in practice and perception of ‘the ethnic division which the
RPF-led government denounces in theory’.52
Conclusion
The findings of this article shed some light on an almost unobservable var-
iable – ethnicity – in the relatively under-observed rural Rwanda. The
ethnic identity of respondents does seem to influence their experience of
transition, and the nature of governance and the respondents’ perceived
nature of their proximity to power lie at the heart of changes in peasants’
perceptions of political representation. This study thus reveals that – at
least in the ‘ordinary’ perception – there has not been a complete detach-
ment of rural Rwandans from their ethnic identities, in spite of claims that
ethnicity is not a relevant term for discussing current Rwandan policies and
daily realities. It underscores Lemarchand’s observation in relation to the
rule of President Bagaza in Burundi (1976–87) when ethnicity was ‘forbid-
den’: abolishing ethnic references does not mean ethnicity ceases to have
meaning and force in daily life.53 Subsequent events in Burundi have
shown the ease with which ethnic identities can be mobilized for violent
purposes even after having been ‘abolished’ for years. This observation
can only result in a worrisome reflection on the durability of ethnic differ-
ence in Rwanda that is currently lurking under the surface of daily life. This
observation does not downplay other important rifts in society, such as
socio-economic class or rural–urban divide, nor does it eclipse from view
the fact that significant variation in ethnic and other social relations exists
at the periphery of society.54 But as the past has shown, if ethnic sentiments
remain, they may form a vector of grievance that may be mobilized, and they
remain, therefore, a potential source of violence.
However, this is an erroneous way of presenting ‘things’ since it hinges
on the assumption that ethnicity needs to be abolished and disappear in
order to prevent a return to ethnically structured violence. What is more
important is that ethnic identities are influenced by contextual factors, es-
51. Insightful here is the increasing difficulty confronting the open discussion of issues of
identity encountered over the years in a project seeking to establish a history curriculum in
Rwanda. Sarah W. Freedman et al., ‘Teaching history after identity-based conflicts: the
Rwanda experience’, Comparative Education Review 52, 4 (2008), pp. 663–90.
52. Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, p. 126.
53. Lemarchand, Burundi, p. 10, pp. 107–18.
54. See Ingelaere, ‘Living the transition’, pp. 28–31, pp. 43–8.
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pecially issues of power. Ethnic identities can acquire political salience: ‘It
is politics that makes ethnicity significant (or, indeed, insignificant), not
ethnicity which invariably defines politics.’55 Instead of focusing on the ad-
justment of ethnicities, it would, therefore, be more productive to focus on
the social context and political systems in which they thrive and make sure
that a resort to violence as a way of doing politics is neither a necessity nor
an option. It implies the building of strong and democratic institutions, the
existence of sufficient countervailing powers in civic structures, and a pol-
itics of inclusion.56
This is not the course taken in contemporary Rwandan politics when
considering macro-level evolutions of the functioning and nature of the
state, its institutions and the post-genocide regime.57 The research findings
also gave insights into how power is exercised at the periphery of Rwandan
society. Despite the adoption of democratic procedures and institutions
and a clear vision and dedication to develop the country and its people,
discussion of the nature of local government structures and the profiles
of local authorities reveals the existence of parallel channels of command
and accountability, while shadow (local) governments are installed not only
to fuel development in the countryside but also to maintain centralized
control over the population with lines of command branched deeply into
rural life. Although currently mobilized for the development of the country,
it was precisely a highly top-down, authoritarian, and non-democratic set of
institutional structures and exercise of power that was of crucial importance
in the administration of the genocide.58 Such forces are still present and
potentially destructive.
55. Newbury and Newbury, ‘A Catholic mass’, p. 313: ‘The paradox is that ethnicity was
simultaneously the product of politics and yet, at times, a powerful determinant of the shape of
political culture.’
56. For the importance of civic structures or ‘institutionalism’ in connection with ethnic
identities see Varshney, Ethnic Conflict. On the importance of consociationalism as an ap-
proach to power sharing in Rwanda, see Stef Vandeginste and Luc Huyse, ‘Consociational
democracy for Rwanda?’ in Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens (eds), Political Economy of
the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The pitfalls of enforced democracy and globalization (Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 101–22; René Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and pow-
er sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African
Affairs 106, 422 (2007) pp. 1–20.
57. Reyntjens, Rwanda, ten years on.
58. A comprehensive insight in the administration of genocide and the role of state struc-
tures and personnel can be found in Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story and Straus, The
Order of Genocide.
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